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TITLE IX OF THE 1972 EDUCATION AMENDMENTS:
HARMONIZING ITS RESTRICTIVE LANGUAGE WITH ITS
BROAD REMEDIAL PURPOSE
INTRODUCTION
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972' proscribes gender
discrimination in "any education program or activity receiving Fed-
eral financial assistance."' 2 Each agency awarding federal funds to any
education program or activity is authorized to promulgate regulations
to effectuate the objectives of the statute2 Enforcement may be car-
ried out by any means authorized by law including the termination of
or refusal to grant federal funds to the noncomplying recipient, but
any such cut off or refusal "shall be limited in its effect to the particu-
lar program, or part thereof, in which such noncompliance has been
so found." 4
The scope of Title IX, which is "program-specific" both as to its
prohibition of sex discrimination and as to its enforcement provision,5
1. Pub. L. No. 92-318, tit. IX, 86 Stat. 373 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686
(1976 & Supp. V 1981).
2. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1976). "No person in the United States shall, on the
basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Fed-
eral financial assistance . Id.
3. Id. § 1682.
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Fed-
eral financial assistance to any education program or activity, by way of
grant, loan, or contract . . . is authorized and directed to effectuate the
provisions of section 1681 of this title with respect to such program or
activity by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability
which shall be consistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute
.... Compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this section
may be effected (1) by the termination of or refusal to grant or to continue
assistance under such program or activity to any recipient as to whom there
has been an express finding. . . of a failure to comply with such require-
ment, but such termination or refusal shall be limited to the particular
political entity, or part thereof, or other recipient as to whom such a finding
has been made, and shall be limited in its effect to the particular program,
or part thereof, in which such noncompliance has been so found, or (2) by
any other means authorized by law.
Id.
4. Id.
5. Two other remedial statutes contain virtually identical program-specific lan-
guage. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 200Od-20OO0d-4 (1976 & Supp. IV
1980), prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color or national origin in a
program receiving federal financial assistance. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29
U.S.C. § 794 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), prohibits discrimination on the basis of being
handicapped in a program receiving federal financial assistance. Therefore, the
interpretation of the program-specific language in Title IX may have implications for
understanding Title VI and the Rehabilitation Act.
1043
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
has been the subject of much dispute. Some courts have narrowly
construed its restrictive language,7 which has had the effect of frus-
trating the broad remedial goals of the statute. On the other hand, at
least one court has given the statute its full remedial effect by ostensi-
bly "reading out" the program-specific language. 8
It is the thesis of this Note that the program-specific language can
be given practical significance without compromising the effectiveness
of Title IX in deterring sex discrimination in education.9 Part I dis-
cusses the two narrow interpretations of the statutory language, and
shows that both frustrate the purposes of the statute by misconstruing
the legislative intent. Part II argues that the broad approach gives
practical meaning to the program-specific language without render-
ing the statute ineffective; it then proposes a test for the application of
this approach.
I. THE NARRow APPROACHES
A. Earmark Theory
Several courts have defined "program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance" as the smallest identifiable unit that is within an
institution responsible for the alleged discrimination and that is specif-
ically "earmarked" to receive direct federal aid.' 0 In University of
6. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1982, at A17, col. 1.
7. E.g., Hillsdale College v. HEW, 696 F.2d 418, 427-30 (6th Cir. 1982); Rice
v. Presidents & Fellows of Harvard College, 663 F.2d 336, 338-39 (1st Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 928 (1982); University of Richmond v. Bell, 543 F. Supp. 321,
322 (E.D. Va. 1982); Bennett v. West Tex. State Univ., 525 F. Supp. 77, 80 (N.D.
Tex. 1981); Othen v. Ann Arbor School Bd., 507 F. Supp. 1376, 1389 (E.D. Mich.
1981); Stewart v. New York Univ., 430 F. Supp. 1305, 1314 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
8. Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684, 693 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. granted,
103 S. Ct. 1181 (1983); accord Haffer v. Temple Univ., 688 F.2d 14, 15-17 (3d Cir.
1982) (per curiam).
9. The scope of this Note is limited to the statutory construction of Title IX.
Thus, constitutional issues that may arise in the context of Title IX-such as whether
first amendment rights of freedom of association are violated by governmental regu-
lation of private institutions or whether students' due process rights are violated by
termination of their financial aid because of the institutional sex discrimination-are
beyond the scope of this Note.
10. See Rice v. Presidents & Fellows of Harvard College, 663 F.2d 336, 338 (1st
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 928 (1982); Dougherty County School Sys. v.
Harris, 622 F.2d 735, 737 (5th Cir. 1980), vacated on other grounds, 102 S. Ct. 2264
(1982); University of Richmond v. Bell, 543 F. Supp. 321, 330 (E.D. Va. 1982);
Bennett v. West Tex. State Univ., 525 F. Supp. 77, 80-81 (N.D. Tex. 1981); Othen v.
Ann Arbor School Bd., 507 F. Supp. 1376, 1387 (E.D. Mich. 1981); Stewart v. New
York Univ., 430 F. Supp. 1305, 1314 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Note, Title VI, Title IX, and
the Private University: Defining "Recipient" and "Program or Part Thereof," 78
Mich. L. Rev. 608, 620-21 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Defining Recipient].
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Richmond v. Bell," for example, the Department of Education'2
(Department) sought to investigate a complaint of sex discrimination
in the university's athletic department.' 3 The federal district court
viewed the athletic department, not the whole university, as the
relevant education program.' 4 Although the university was a benefi-
ciary of a variety of federal grant and loan statutes,' 5 the court held
that the Department had no authority to make such an investigation
or to terminate any federal aid because the "athletic program" did not
directly receive earmarked federal funds.' 6
The earmark theory is a very narrow interpretation of the scope of
Title IX. Private universities that purposely avoid receiving direct
federal aid'17 would be entirely exempt from the statute, even though
their students may receive federal grants and loans.' 8 Moreover, gen-
eral non-earmarked federal aid, though directly received by an insti-
tution, would not trigger Title IX's application.19 Finally, compliance
with and enforcement of Title IX would apply, if at all, only to
scattered areas within an educational institution, not to the institution
itself.20 Beside these practical consequences, however, the remedial
nature, statutory language and the legislative history of Title IX all
mandate a rejection of this narrow reading.
11. 543 F. Supp. 321 (E.D. Va. 1982).
12. Originally, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare was the prin-
cipal federal agency responsible for enforcement of Title IX. But in 1979 its functions
under the statute were transferred to the Department of Education by § 301(a)(3) of
the Department of Education Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 96-88, 93 Stat. 678
(codified at 20 U.S.C. § 3441(a)(3) (Supp. V 1981)).
13. 543 F. Supp. at 323.
14. Id. at 330-31.
15. Id. at 323 & n.1.
16. Id. at 333.
17. See Hillsdale College v. HEW, 696 F.2d 418, 420 (6th Cir. 1982); Grove City
College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684, 689 & n.7 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct.
1181 (1983).
18. The earmark theory would exempt a whole class of private institutions from
Title IX. See 122 Cong. Rec. 28,145 (1976) (remarks of Sen. Bayh). The impact
would be great: Approximately 1000 private colleges receive federal aid only in the
form of student loans and grants. N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1983, at A15, col. 1.
19. University of Richmond v. Bell, 543 F. Supp. 321, 328-29 (E.D. Va. 1982);
see Bennett v. West Tex. State Univ., 525 F. Supp. 77, 80-81 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
20. See Rice v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 663 F.2d 336, 338 (1st
Cir. 1981) (grading practices not covered by Title IX because federal aid earmarked
only to work-study program), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 928 (1982); University of
Richmond v. Bell, 543 F. Supp. 321, 330 (E.D. Va. 1982) (athletic department not
covered by Title IX because federal aid disbursed only to library and to students);
Bennett v. West Tex. State Univ., 525 F. Supp. 77, 80-81 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (athletic
department not covered by Title IX because federal aid disbursed only to students);
Othen v. Ann Arbor School Bd., 507 F. Supp. 1376, 1389-90 (E.D. Mich. 1981)
(athletic department not covered by Title IX because federal aid received was non-
earmarked); Stewart v. New York Univ., 430 F. Supp. 1305, 1314 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)
(law school admissions not covered by Title IX because federal aid disbursed only for
housing and to students).
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1. Remedial Nature of Title IX
Title IX was enacted to achieve two remedial goals: "to avoid the
use of federal resources to support discriminatory practices [and] to
provide individual citizens [with] effective protection against those
practices." 2' The statute should be read liberally so that these benefits
may be fully achieved. 22 Indeed, the Supreme Court recently recog-
nized the need to read Title IX broadly. In North Haven Board of
Education v. Bell,23 female teachers sued the school board under Title
IX for alleged discriminatory practices. 24 The issue before the Court
was whether the word "person" in Title IX's enforcement section2 5
included not only students but employees of an education program as
well.2 6 While admitting that "Title IX does not expressly include or
exclude employees from its scope,"2 7 the Court nevertheless held that
"person" does include employees of an education program. 2 The
Court reasoned, "if we are to give [Title IX] the scope that its origins
dictate, we must accord it a sweep as broad as its language. 29
Contrary to Title IX's broad remedial objectives and to the Court's
clear inclination in North Haven to read the statute expansively, the
earmark theory severely restricts the intended remedial effects of the
statute.30 It inadequately prevents the use of federal monies in support
of sex discrimination in education.3 ' Under the earmark theory, de-
spite the presence of sex discrimination in certain areas of an institu-
tion, Title IX's proscription and enforcement provisions would not
cover at least three forms of federal financial assistance: 1) direct
21. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979); see 122 Cong.
Rec. 28,145 (1976) (remarks of Sen. Pell); 118 Cong. Rec. 5808 (1972) (remarks of
Sen. Bayh); cf. 110 Cong. Rec. 6543 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey, during the
floor debates on Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
22. It is a well-established principle of statutory construction that remedial
statutes should be read broadly. 2A C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction §
46.07, at 65 (4th ed. 1973) [hereinafter referred to as Sutherland]; 3 id. § 65.03, at
163 (1974).
23. 456 U.S. 512 (1982).
24. Id. at 517-18.
25. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1976).
26. 456 U.S. at 520.
27. Id. at 522.
28. Id. at 520-35. The language of the decision suggests that Title IX covers not
only teachers but all employees, even those who are only remotely connected with
the educational process, such as secretaries and janitors. Id. at 541-42. (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
29. Id. at 521 (quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801 (1966)).
30. See Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684, 697 (3d Cir. 1982), cert.
granted, 103 S. Ct. 1181 (1983).
31. 122 Cong. Rec. 28,145 (1976) (remarks of Sen. Pell); see Grove City College
v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684, 691-92 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1181 (1983).
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federal funds earmarked for an area free of discrimination, 32 2) gen-
eral non-earmarked funds received directly by an institution33 and 3)
direct grants and loans to students. 34 Yet realistically, these forms of
assistance may support discriminatory practices. First, these forms of
federal aid, by defraying the overall costs of education to an inte-
grated institution, in effect "release" institutional funds to be used for
the benefit of discriminatory areas. 35 Second, the availability of stu-
32. The College Library Resources Program, 20 U.S.C. § 1029 (Supp. V 1981),
which earmarks funds for the purchase of library materials, is an example of direct
earmarked funds.
33. An example of general, non-earmarked funds is the Basic Eduction for Adults
Program, Adult Education Act of 1966, §§ 301-314, Pub. L. No. 89-750, 80 Stat.
1216 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1213 (1976)). While this aid is allocated to
further a specific educational purpose, the funds are not earmarked for a particular
area within an institution.
34. Students enrolled in higher education, for example, can receive grants or
loans under four federal programs: 1) the National Direct Student Loan (NDSL)
program, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1087aa-1087ff (1976 & Supp. V 1981), 2) the Supplementary
Educational Opportunity (SEOG) program, id. §§ 1070b-1070b-3, 3) the Basic
Educational Opportunity (BEOG) program, id. § 1070a, and 4) the Guaranteed
Student Loan (GSL) program, id. §§ 1071-1087-4. These various programs have
different methods of disbursement. Under NDSL and SEOG, federal monies are
disbursed by the university to needy students. Id. §§ 1070b-1070b-3, 1087aa-1087ff.
Under BEOG, as codified, federal monies were to be disbursed directly to students.
Id. § 1070a. But its regulations set up a Regular and an Alternate Disbursement
System: Under the Regular Disbursement System, 34 C.F.R. §§ 690.71-.85 (1982),
the funds go to the college or university to distribute to eligible students, id. § 690.72;
under the Alternate Disbursement System, id. § 690.91, the funds are disbursed
directly to the students once the institution certifies that they are enrolled. Id. §
690.92. Under GSL, monies are disbursed by private lending institutions to the
students, and the loans are guaranteed by the government. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1071-1087-4
(1976 & Supp. V 1981).
35. Hillsdale College v. HEW, 696 F.2d 418, 434 (6th Cir. 1982) (Edwards, C.
J., dissenting); Haffer v. Temple Univ., 688 F.2d 14, 16-17 (3d Cir. 1982); Grove
City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684, 695-96 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct.
1181 (1983); see Rivera & Frank, Othen v. Ann Arbor School Board: A Weakening of
Title IX Protection Against Sex Discrimination, 26 St. Louis L.J. 857, 873 (1982); cf.
Wright v. Columbia Univ., 520 F. Supp. 789, 792 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (Rehabilitation
Act); Poole v. South Plainfield Bd. of Educ., 490 F. Supp. 948, 951 (D.N.J. 1980)
(same); Bob Jones Univ. v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597, 603 (D.S.C. 1974) (Title VI),
aff'd mem., 529 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1975).
The release theory was first adopted in Bob Jones Univ. v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp.
597 (D.S.C. 1974), af-'d mem., 529 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1975), a Title VI case. In Bob
Jones, HEW terminated veterans' benefits to eligible students at the university be-
cause of the university's discriminatory practices. Id. at 600-01. The university
brought an action to enjoin the termination order on the ground that it did not
directly receive federal financial aid. Id. at 600. The court held that veterans'
benefits, though disbursed directly to students, nevertheless constituted federal finan-
cial assistance under Title VI. Id. at 602-03. The court reasoned that because
veterans' benefits "serve to defray the costs of the educational program . . . institu-
tional funds which would, in the absence of federal assistance, be spent on the
student [are thereby released.]" Id. at 602.
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dent grants and loans enables some students to enroll in institutions
that they otherwise could not afford to attend,3 6 thereby maintaining
full enrollment and maximizing tuition revenue for the institution. 37
Moreover, the earmark theory fails to provide individuals with
effective protection against sex discrimination in education. Discrimi-
nation in unfunded areas may "infect" the whole institution, includ-
ing funded areas, by creating a discriminatory environment.3 8 Yet
under the earmark theory Title IX's proscription and enforcement
provisions would attach no consequence to this discrimination, 39 thus
Courts adopting the earmark definition reject the release theory in part because
they view an institution as a collection of atomized parts, each discrete and separable
for the purposes of compliance with Title IX. See Rice v. President & Fellows of
Harvard College, 663 F.2d 336, 338-39 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 928
(1982); Dougherty County School Sys. v. Harris, 622 F.2d 735, 737 (5th Cir. 1980),
vacated on other grounds, 102 S. Ct. 2264 (1982); University of Richmond v. Bell,
543 F. Supp. 321, 330-31 (E.D. Va. 1982); Othen v. Ann Arbor School Bd., 507 F.
Supp. 1376, 1387 (E.D. Mich. 1981); Stewart v. New York Univ., 430 F. Supp. 1305,
1314 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). This Note contends, however, that an integrated institution
does not contain wholly independent and insulated parts, and any attempt to so
dissect an institution frustrates Title IX's broad remedial purposes. See infra notes
111-15, 122-35 and accompanying text.
36. Bob Jones v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597, 603 (D.S.C. 1974), aff'd mem., 529
F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1975).
37. Id.; see 122 Cong. Rec. 28,145 (1976) (remarks of Sen. Bayh); Drinan,
Education: To Cherish, N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1983, at E17, col. 1.
38. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 539 (1982); Board of Pub.
Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068, 1078-79 (5th Cir. 1969); Todd, Title IX of the
1972 Education Amendments: Preventing Sex Discrimination in Public Schools, 53
Tex. L. Rev. 103, 111-12 (1974); Defining Recipient, supra note 10, at 624.
The infection theory was first articulated in the context of Title VI in Board of
Pub. Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969). In Finch, HEW granted
the public schools of Taylor County general aid for specific educational purposes
under three funding programs. Id. at 1074. The court recognized in dicta that the
funded programs could be infected by discrimination in other areas of the institution.
As the court stated, "if [the funds provided] support a program which is infected by a
discriminatory environment, then termination of such funds is proper." Id. at 1078.
Because the record on appeal was inadequate to determine whether "infection" had
occurred, the court remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. Id.
at 1073-74, 1079. The Supreme Court recently referred to the infection theory of
Finch, North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 539 (1982), signaling that the
Court may soon adopt the theory.
Critics of the infection theory argue that under the theory Title IX would be given
such an expansive scope that the program-specific language would lose all its practi-
cal meaning. See, e.g., Dougherty County School Sys. v. Harris, 622 F.2d 735, 737
(5th Cir. 1980), vacated on other grounds, 102 S. Ct. 2264 (1982); Kuhn, Title IX:
Employment and Athletics are Outside HEW's Jurisdiction, 65 Geo. L.J. 49, 69
(1976). This Note argues, however, that the infection theory does not render Title
IX's restrictive language nugatory, but rather adequately limits Title IX to avoid
unduly harsh results. See infra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
39. See Dougherty County School Sys. v. Harris, 622 F.2d 735, 737 (5th Cir.
1980), vacated on other grounds, 102 S. Ct. 2264 (1982); Othen v. Ann Arbor School
Bd., 507 F. Supp. 1376, 1389 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
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leaving many victims of discrimination unprotected. Additionally,
under the earmark theory an institution may easily evade Title IX by
constructing a "financial Chinese wall" around discriminatory areas
so that they receive no direct federal funds.
40
For these reasons, the earmark theory frustrates the broad remedial
purposes of Title IX. 41 This approach should therefore be rejected
unless it is clear that Congress intended such a restrictive reading.
42
The statutory language and the legislative history indicate, however,
that Congress intended Title IX to have a broader scope than that
given it by the earmark theory.
2. Statutory Language
Title IX's coverage extends to "any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance. ' 43 This language, on its face,
does not restrict the statute to institutions that receive direct federal
grants for specifically earmarked areas. The statute makes no express
distinction between general aid and funds that are earmarked for
specific areas.44 Moreover, the plain meaning of the statutory lan-
guage encompasses more than the mere receipt of payment. 45 Federal
40. Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684, 706 (3d Cir. 1982) (Becker, J.,
concurring), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1181 (1983); see Rivera & Frank, supra note
35, at 873.
41. The earmark theory promotes an arguably legitimate policy-restricting
governmental regulation of private institutions. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at 15-16, Grove City
College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1181 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as Petition for Certiorari]; Defining Recipient, supra note 10, at
608. Advocates of this policy argue that a private institution that intentionally avoids
direct assistance should remain unregulated. E.g., Petition for Certiorari, supra, at
2-3. This policy argument, however, is not justified. First of all, a private institution
is not truly self-sufficient if its students are subsidized by federal grants and loans. If
these institutions wish to remain free of Title IX's regulations, they should provide
their own financial assistance for their students. Furthermore, Congress has the
authority to attach conditions on monies it disburses. See Grove City College v. Bell,
687 F.2d 684, 701 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1181 (1983); Bob Jones
Univ. v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597, 606 (D.S.C. 1974), aff'd mem., 529 F.2d 514
(4th Cir. 1975); cf. O'Bannon v. Town Ct. Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773, 785 (1980)
(recipient of Medicare must apply it to a nursing home deemed "qualified" by
government standards to receive such benefits).
42. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521 (1982); cf. Bob Jones
Univ. v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597, 604 (D.S.C. 1974) (Title VI), aff'd mem., 529
F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1975). See generally 3 Sutherland, supra note 22, § 60.01, at 29,
§ 65.03, at 163, § 72.05, at 392.
43. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1976).
44. See id.
45. See Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684, 691 (3d Cir. 1982), cert.
granted, 103 S. Ct. 1181 (1983); Rivera & Frank, supra note 35, at 861-62.
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grants and loans to students clearly benefit educational institutions by
reducing the strain on their financial aid programs46 and by making it
possible for more students to enroll, 47 and hence appear to be encom-
passed by the statute. Admittedly, the students themselves are the
recipients of federal financial assistance in the forms of grants and
loans. 48 The statute, however, does not by its terms limit its scope to
direct receipt of federal aid. Had Congress meant to restrict the
coverage of Title IX to directly funded programs, as the earmark
theory contends, it could have simply added the word "direct" to the
statute. The absence of such an easily rendered limitation suggests
Congress had a contrary intention. 49 Thus, a fair reading of Title IX's
broad extension of coverage, contrary to the interpretation of the
earmark theory, indicates that the statute includes all forms of federal
financial assistance to education-general aid, specifically earmarked
aid and indirect aid.50 Resort to the legislative history confirms that
Congress intended Title IX to have such an expansive scope.
3. Legislative History
The legislative history of Title IX is sparse because the statute was
introduced as a floor amendment, and therefore no committee reports
exist. 51 Although the pre-enactment history does not explicitly address
the extent of Title IX's coverage, 52 the evidence that does exist favors a
broader reading of the statute's scope than that given it under the
earmark theory. In 1971, a bill containing the key provisions of what
46. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
47. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
48. See supra note 34.
49. 2A Sutherland, supra note 22, § 47.38, at 173. Addition of words when
interpreting a statute is inappropriate if it "could partially defeat the purpose of the
statute." Id.; cf. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 520-21 (1982)
(refusing to exclude employees from Title IX coverage); Bob Jones Univ. v. Johnson,
396 F. Supp. 597, 603 (D.S.C. 1974) (refusing to exclude veterans' benefits from Title
VI coverage), aff'd mem., 529 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1975).
50. Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684, 691 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. granted,
103 S. Ct. 1181 (1983). The Grove court stated that "by its all inclusive terminology
the statute appears to encompass all forms of federal aid to education, direct or
indirect." Id. (emphasis in original).
51. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 520-21 (1982); Hillsdale
College v. HEW, 696 F.2d 418, 426 (6th Cir. 1982); Grove City College v. Bell, 687
F.2d 684, 692 n.15 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1181 (1983); 121 Cong.
Rec. 23,845 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Helms).
52. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 520-21 (1982); see Hillsdale
College v. HEW, 696 F.2d 418, 427 (6th Cir. 1982); Grove City College v. Bell, 687
F.2d 684, 697-98 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1181 (1983).
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would later become Title IX53 was introduced in Congress.54 The
statements of several senators speaking in favor of the bill, to the effect
that "no funds" should be extended to institutions that discriminate on
the basis of sex,55 imply that the statute was intended to have an
expansive reach. 56 Moreover, one year later on the day of Title IX's
enactment, the floor debates clearly reveal Congress' broad objective
to "root out [sex discrimination] as thoroughly as possible. ' 57 Senator
Bayh, the sponsor of Title IX, called the statute "a strong and compre-
hensive measure,"58 the impact of which was to be "far-reaching." 59
Surely this legislative understanding and intent conflict with the ear-
mark theory's severely restrictive reading of Title IX. 60
The post-enactment history provides further evidence that Congress
did not intend to restrict Title IX's coverage to those discrete areas
within an institution that directly receive earmarked funds. The De-
partment of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) published final
regulations in June 197561 to implement and enforce the provisions of
the statute. The regulations, in direct conflict with the earmark the-
ory, indicate that institutions receiving general non-earmarked
53. Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684, 692 & n.17 (3d Cir. 1982), cert.
granted, 103 S. Ct. 1181 (1983); 118 Cong. Rec. 5808 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Bayh).
54. 117 Cong. Rec. 30,399 (1971) (remarks of Sen. Bayh).
55. 117 Cong. Rec. 30,158-59 (1971) (remarks of Sen. McGovern); id. at 30,408
(remarks of Sen. Bayh); id. at 39,256 (colloquy between Reps. Green and Steiger); cf.
110 Cong. Rec. 6543 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey during floor debates on Title
VI).
56. Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684, 692-93 (3d Cir. 1982), cert.
granted, 103 S. Ct. 1181 (1983); see 2A Sutherland, supra note 22, § 49.11, at 265-
66.
57. 118 Cong. Rec. 5804 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Bayh).
58. Id. at 5806 (remarks of Sen. Bayh).
59. Id. at 5808 (remarks of Sen. Bayh). Although the statements of one legislator
on the floor of Congress usually should not be given great weight, the Supreme Court
in North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982), stated that because Title
IX's legislative history is so sparse "Senator Bayh's remarks, as those of the sponsor of
the language ultimately enacted, are an authoritative guide to the statute's construc-
tion." Id. at 526-27.
60. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text. One commentator has pieced
together different bits of legislative history to conclude that Title IX was enacted to
serve a narrow purpose. Comment, HEW's Regulation Under Title IX of the Educa-
tion Amendments of 1972: Ultra Vires Challenges, 1976 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 133, 158-61,
170-72, 186. The commentator, however, failed to mention and respond to the
repeated indications in the legislative history that Title IX was to have an expansive
scope. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
61. 40 Fed. Reg. 24,127 (1975), reissued at 45 Fed. Reg. 30,802 (1980). The
regulations were reissued when the Department of Education took over HEW's
functions under Title IX. See supra note 12. Today the regulations are in 34 C.F.R.
§§ 106.1-.71 (1982). Although they have undergone some changes since they were
published in 1975, the relevant sections remain unaltered.
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funds62 and direct aid to students are subject to Title IX.13 Under the
General Education Provisions Act, 64 if within a forty-five day period 5
beginning on the publication date Congress determined that the regu-
lations were inconsistent with the statute, it had the authority to
adopt a concurrent resolution disapproving them. 66 Absent the adop-
tion of such a resolution the regulations would become formally effec-
tive. 7
The day after publication of the regulations Senator Helms pro-
posed a resolution to disapprove the regulations in part because they
failed to limit the scope of Title IX to direct receipt of financial aid. 68
Several resolutions were concurrently introduced in the House to
disapprove the regulations.6 9 None of these resolutions was passed.
Congress not only refused to disapprove HEW's regulations; it also
has repeatedly declined to amend Title IX to limit its scope expressly
to the direct receipt of earmarked financial aid. 70 The statements
62. HEW's regulations, for example, specifically cover athletics, 34 C.F.R. §
106.41 (1982), which rarely, if ever, receive earmarked federal funds. University of
Richmond v. Bell, 543 F. Supp. 321, 332 n.17 (E.D. Va. 1982); Cox, Intercollegiate
Athletics and Title IX, 46 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 34, 37 (1977); Kuhn, supra note 38, at
77; Rivera & Frank, supra note 35, at 867; see Discrimination Regulations: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Postsecondary Education of the House Comm. on Educa-
tion and Labor, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 171 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Bayh) [hereinafter
referred to as Postsecondary Hearings]. Therefore, the regulations seem to indicate
that the receipt of general funds is sufficient to subject non-earmarked areas to Title
Ix.
63. The regulations define "Federalfinancial assistance" as including "[s]cholar-
ships, loans, grants, wages or other funds extended to any entity ... or extended
directly to such students for payment to that entity." 34 C.F.R. § 106.2(g)(ii) (1982).
A "Recipient" of federal assistance is defined as:
[A]ny State or political subdivision thereof, or any instrumentality of a State
or political subdivision thereof, any public or private agency, institution, or
organization, or other entity, or any person, to whom Federal financial
assistance is extended directly or through another recipient and which oper-
ates an education program or activity which receives or benefits from such
assistance, including any subunit, successor, assignee, or transferee thereof.
Id. § 106.2(h).
64. Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 431(d)(1), 88 Stat. 567 (1974) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §
1232(a)-(g) (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
65. 20 U.S.C. § 1232(d) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
66. Id. § 1232(d)(1).
67. Id. § 1232(g).
68. 121 Cong. Rec. 17,300 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Helms).
69. 121 Cong. Rec. 21,687 (1975) (remarks of Rep. O'Hara); id. at 19,209
(remarks of Rep. Martin).
70. On the last day of the 45-day review period, for example, Senator Helms
introduced the following amendment to Title IX: "Title IX shall apply only to
education programs and activities which directly receive Federal financial assist-
ance." Id. at 23,846 (statement of Sen. Helms) (emphasis added). Unless such an
amendment were enacted, Helms feared that HEW's regulations would bring within
the coverage of Title IX "activities which do not receive Federal financial assistance
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made by several senators opposing these amendments, including those
of the sponsor of Title IX, clearly indicate that Congress intended
Title IX to cover not only direct aid, but also general and indirect
aid.71
Admittedly, Congress's failure to disapprove the regulations and to
adopt restrictive amendments is not conclusive evidence that the
broad regulations accurately reflect the legislative intent. 72 Neverthe-
less, the fact that Congress failed to act, though fully aware of the
broad sweep of the regulations and the controversy surrounding them,
lends support to the argument that Congress intended Title IX to
cover general and indirect aid.73 This is particularly so since in the
in any reasonable sense of the concept." Id. at 23,845 (statement of Sen. Helms).
Congress took no action on the Helms bill.
Similarly, in 1976, Senator McClure proposed defining federal financial assistance
as "assistance received by the institution directly from the federal government." 122
Cong. Rec. 28,144 (1976) (emphasis added). McClure expressed concern that unless
Title IX were so amended, private colleges that have gone to "great pains to avoid
any appearance of Federal support" would nonetheless be "subjected to Federal
control" merely because their students received federal loans and grants. Id. at
28,145 (statement of Sen. McClure). He argued that HEW was overreaching by
regulating educational programs in which student grant and loans constituted the
only federal link. Id. The amendment was defeated by a 50-30 vote. Id. at 28,148.
In addition to these unsuccessful attempts expressly to exclude direct grants and
loans to students from Title IX, several amendments were proposed to eliminate
intercollegiate athletics from the scope of the statute. Id. at 28,136 (remarks of Sen.
McClure); 121 Cong. Rec. 17,300 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Helms); 120 Cong. Rec.
15,322 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Tower). Since athletics rarely receive earmarked
funds, see supra note 62, these amendments were in effect attempts to limit Title IX
to programs specifically earmarked to receive aid.
71. The McClure amendment to limit Title IX expressly to direct assistance, for
example, elicited an immediate and vehement attack by Senator Pell, the chief
Senate sponsor of the basic grant (BEOG) program. He objected to the amendment
on the ground that "no funds under the basic grant program would be covered by
title IX." 122 Cong. Rec. 28,145 (1976) (statement of Sen. Pell). Pell argued that
"[w]hile these dollars are paid to students they flow through and ultimately go to
institutions of higher education," and thus, Congress' position should not be "that
these Federal funds can be used for further discrimination based on sex." Id. Senator
Bayh also vigorously attacked the McClure amendment, arguing that Title IX should
cover indirect federal assistance. Id. (statement of Sen. Bayh). He pointed out that if
a student is benefited, the school is benefited, and therefore the distinction between
direct and indirect receipt is spurious. Bayh argued that the amendment signaled "a
great departure from equity. It would set a terrible example and would open the
floodgates to other efforts to destroy what we are trying to accomplish here." Id.
Senator Bayh also objected to the attempts to exclude athletics from Title IX. He
termed these attempts a "tragic departure" which would exclude the very areas
Congress intended Title IX to cover. Id. at 28,144 (statement of Sen. Bayh).
72. North Haven Bd. of Edue. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 533-34 (1982); see 2A
Sutherland, supra note 22, § 49.10, at 261, § 49.05, at 238-39.
73. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 534 (1982); see 2A Suther-
land, supra note 22, § 49.10, at 261-62. The Supreme Court in North Haven relied on
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past Congress has not hesitated to modify the scope of Title IX when it
disagreed with HEW's regulations.74
In sum, the earmark theory, which curtails the remedial goals of
the statute, finds no support in either the statutory language or the
legislative history. This approach should therefore be rejected in favor
the post-enactment history of Title IX to conclude that employees were "persons"
under Title IX's proscription section. 456 U.S. at 530-35. The Court looked to
Congress' failure to disapprove HEW's regulations, which covered employment, id.
at 530-33, and to the rejected amendments that would have excluded employment
from Title IX, id. at 534-35, to support its conclusion that employees are within the
scope of Title IX. Id.
74. After HEW had published for comment the Title IX regulations, Congress in
1974 amended the statute to exempt fraternities and sororities from its reach. Pub. L.
No. 93-568, § 3(a), 88 Stat. 1855, 1862 (1974) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(b)
(1976)); see 120 Cong. Rec. 41,391 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Quie). Then, in 1976,
Congress further exempted Boys and Girls conferences, father-son, mother-daughter
events, and beauty pageant scholarships. See id. 27,979-88 (1976) (remarks of Sens.
Fannin, Dole, Thurmond, Bayh, Humphrey and Eagleton). The proposition that
Congress intended to include indirect assistance is further supported by the fact that
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-4 (1976 & Supp.
IV 1980), after which Title IX was patterned, has been interpreted to include aid to
students. Yakin v. University of Ill., 508 F. Supp. 848, 850 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Bob
Jones Univ. v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597, 602-03 (D.S.C. 1974), aff'd mem., 529
F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1975); see Rivera & Frank, supra note 35, at 864, 866; Note,
Board of Public Instruction v. Finch: Unwarranted Compromise of Title VI's Termi-
nation Sanction, 118 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1113, 1121-22 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Unwarranted Compromise]. Title VI is an authoritative guide in ascertaining the
meaning of Title IX. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 696 (1979). The
two statutes have virtually identical language. Compare 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-
1 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) (Title VI) with 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1682 (1976 & Supp. V
1981) (Title IX). Furthermore, both statutes serve similar objectives-to prevent
federal monies from being used to support discriminatory practices. Cannon v.
University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979).
Ample evidence exists that Congress expected the interpretation of Title VI to
govern the interpretation of Title IX. Id. at 694-99 & nn.16-23. Originally, Congress
planned to merely add the word "sex" to Title VI. See Hearings on § 805 of H.R.
16098 Before the Special Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in Discrimination Against Women 3 (C. Stimpson
ed. 1973). Fearing that this would expose Title VI to further amendments that might
leave the statute "gutted" on the floor of Congress, North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell,
456 U.S. 512, 546-47 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citing the Postsecondary Hearings,
supra note 62, at 409), Congress instead enacted a separate statute lifting Title VI's
language, Postsecondary Hearings, supra note 62, at 409 (remarks of Rep. O'Hara,
arguing that Title IX was a "cut and paste job," using a "Xerox" of Title VI).
Throughout the legislative debates repeated references to Title VI were made to
explain Title IX's provisions. 122 Cong. Rec. 28,145-46 (1976) (remarks of Sen.
Bayh); 118 Cong. Rec. 5803, 5807-08 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Bayh); 117 Cong. Rec.
30,407-08 (1971) (remarks of Sen. Bayh). On the day of Title IX's enactment, for
example, Senator Bayh pointed out that since Title IX's provisions are parallel to
those in Title VI, they "have been tested under title VI ... for the last 8 years so that
we have evidence of their effectiveness and flexibility." 118 Cong. Ree. 5807 (1972)
(statement of Sen. Bayh).
1054 [Vol. 51
1983] TITLE IX'S PROGRAM-SPECIFIC LANGUAGE
of one that both promotes the statute's purposes and yields a meaning
consistent with the legislative intent.
B. Grant-Statute Definition
One court recently construed the program-specific language in Title
IX as referring to the particular federal grant statute providing aid to
educational institutions. In Hillsdale College v. HEW,75 certain stu-
dents at a private college that had refused to accept any direct federal
aid individually secured federal loans or grants to help defray the costs
of their education. 76 According to HEW's regulations, this student aid
was sufficient to subject the entire college to Title IX. 77 The college,
however, refused to file the required Assurance of Compliance, 7
whereupon HEW sought an order terminating the students' financial
assistance. 79 The Sixth Circuit held that the federal loan and grant
statutes constituted the "program" under the statute. 0 Because the
Assurance of Compliance would cover the entire college, and was not
limited to the administration of the grant statutes, the college was not
required to execute the Assurance.8'
This interpretation of the program-specific language shares the
weaknesses of the earmark theory. While somewhat broader, it still
severely restricts the scope of Title IX, thereby unduly compromising
the effectiveness of the statute. Moreover, it is based largely on a
dubious analysis of legislative history.
75. 696 F.2d 418 (6th Cir. 1982).
76. Id. at 420.
77. Id. at 421; 34 C.F.R. § 106.2(g)(1)(ii) (1982); see also 122 Cong. Rec. 28,145
(1976) (remarks of Sen. McClure, arguing against this result).
78. HEW's regulations require that as a condition precedent to its approval of
federal aid, the institution must file an assurance, HEW Form 639A, that it has
complied with Title IX. 34 C.F.R. § 106.4(a) (1982). The regulations provide:
Every application for Federal financial assistance for any education pro-
gram or activity shall as condition of its approval contain or be accompa-
nied by an assurance from the applicant or recipient, satisfactory to the
Assistant Secretary, that each education program or activity operated by the
applicant or recipient and to which this part applies will be operated in
compliance with this part. An assurance of compliance . . . shall not be
satisfactory to the Assistant Secretary if the applicant or recipient to whom
such assurance applies fails to commit itself to take whatever remedial
action is necessary . . . to eliminate existing discrimination on the basis of
sex or to eliminate the effects of past discrimination whether occurring prior
or subsequent to the submission to the Assistant Secretary of such assurance.
Id.
79. 696 F.2d at 421-22.
80. Id. at 430.
81. Id.
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1. Narrow Scope
The grant-statute interpretation of the program-specific language is
somewhat broader than that of the earmark theory. Clearly, broad
funding statutes that provide general non-earmarked grants to institu-
tions would be covered by Title IX.82 So, too, would be grant statutes
providing aid to students, at least to the extent that an institution
administers the assistance. 3 Nevertheless, although more forms of
federal assistance are covered by Title IX under this interpretation,
the statute's coverage remains too restrictive to effectuate its remedial
purposes adequately.8 4
Under the grant-statute definition, compliance is generally limited
to administering the funding statutes in a sex-blind manner.8 5 This
minimal requirement renders Title IX ineffective. An institution that
receives no direct aid but has students that receive grants and loans
administered exclusively by a federal agency would have no obliga-
tions under Title IX. s6 And even when the institution administers
student aid or receives direct assistance under the grant statute, wide-
spread sex discrimination in an institution would be beyond the reach
of Title IX so long as the administration of the discrete grant statute
remained free of discrimination. 7 Yet these forms of federal assist-
ance, contrary to the broad objective of Congress, support discrimina-
tory practices by "releasing" funds for use in the discriminatory ar-
eas.88 In addition, because compliance with the statute is required
only in the administration of the funding program, individuals are
afforded scant, if any, protection from sex discrimination in other
areas.
89
82. Id. at 426-27; cf. Board of Pub. Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068, 1074,
1078-79 (5th Cir. 1969) (Title VI). Finch, for example, involved general grants for
specific educational purposes, but not earmarked for specific areas within the school
system. Id. at 1074. The Finch court held that the aid was subject to Title VI. Id. at
1078-79.
83. See Hillsdale College v. HEW, 696 F.2d 418, 429-30 (6th Cir. 1982).
84. Id. at 436-37 (Edwards, C.J., dissenting); Unwarranted Compromise, supra
note 74, at 1140.
85. See Hillsdale College v. HEW, 696 F.2d 418, 430 (6th Cir. 1982); Board of
Pub. Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068, 1078 (5th Cir. 1969).
86. See Hillsdale College v. HEW, 696 F.2d 418, 420 & nn.4-7, 430 (6th Cir.
1982).
87. Several courts and commentators have criticized limiting coverage of Title IX
and Title VI to the specific grant statute for this reason. See, e.g., Grove City College
v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684, 696 (3d Cir. 1982) (Title IX), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1181
(1983); Bob Jones Univ. v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597, 603 (D.S.C. 1974) (Title VI),
aff'd mem., 529 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1975); Rivera & Frank, supra note 35, at 873;
Todd, supra note 38, at 112.
88. See supra note 35.
89. See Hillsdale College v. HEW, 696 F.2d 418, 429-30 (6th Cir. 1982); Board
of Pub. Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068, 1078-79 (5th Cir. 1969).
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If compliance under the grant-statute definition is minimal, the
enforcement power is undermined. Such a definition limits the termi-
nation sanction to federal monies connected with a discriminatory
funding program. A potent enforcement weapon-the termination of
direct aid to students-would therefore be automatically elimi-
nated. 0 Moreover, even if discrimination exists in a particular fund-
ing program, only the aid given pursuant to that statute may be
terminated; all other federal assistance, absent an independent show-
ing of discrimination in each corresponding funding program, could
not be terminated. 9' This severely reduces the ability of a federal
agency to exert economic pressure as a means to discourage discrimi-
nation within an institution, particularly if only relatively small
amounts of money are involved in the discriminatory funding pro-
gram. Thus, restricting the termination sanction to a case-by-case
finding of discrimination within a particular grant statute greatly
undermines the enforcement provisions of Title IX.
2. Legislative History
The legislative history does not support this restrictive definition of
the program-specific language. Since the history of Title IX is sparse, 92
proponents of the grant-statute definition rely on the legislative his-
tory of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 93 upon which Title IX
is based,94 to ascertain the meaning of the program-specific lan-
gauge.95 Great significance is given under the grant-statute definition
to the fact that during the congressional debates repeated references
were made to various federal funding programs. 96 Based on these
references it is reasoned that Congress intended the term "program" in
Title IX to mean "funding program. 97
This is an erroneous interpretation of the legislative history. "Pro-
gram" is a common word the meaning of which varies in different
contexts. Thus, the use of the term in both the anti-discrimination
statutes and the federal grant statutes does not necessarily mean that it
has the same meaning in both contexts. 98 Clearer evidence is needed
90. See Hillsdale College v. HEW, 696 F.2d 418, 429-30 (6th Cir. 1982).
91. See id.; cf. Board of Pub. Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068, 1078-79 (5th
Cir. 1969) (Title VI).
92. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
93. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-4 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
94. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694-98 (1979).
95. Hillsdale College v. HEW, 696 F.2d 418, 425-27 & n.24 (6th Cir. 1982).
96. Id. at 427 & n.24; cf. Board of Pub. Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068,
1077 (5th Cir. 1969) (Title VI).
97. Hillsdale College v. HEW 696 F.2d 418, 427 & n.24 (6th Cir. 1982); cf.
Board of Pub. Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068, 1077 (5th Cir. 1969) (Title VI).
98. See 2A Sutherland, supra note 22, § 47.27, at 137; Frankfurter, Some Reflec-
tions on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 537-38 (1947).
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before this conclusion can be confidently drawn, 99 particularly be-
cause on its face the program-specific language does not support such
a reading. Section 901(a) of Title IX refers to a "program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance.' '100 Were "program" to mean
grant statute, however, this language would become nonsensical, for
a funding program does not receive assistance-it is the assistance.
Moreover, one commentator has correctly pointed out that the refer-
ences in the debates to funding programs are not helpful in interpret-
ing the statutory language because many of these references were
made during the debates over the House version of Title VI, which
contained no program-specific language.' 10
Thus, because the restrictive grant-statute definition both miscon-
strues the legislative history and frustrates the remedial purposes of
the statute, it, like the earmark theory, should be rejected.
II. THE INTEGRATED INSTITUTION APPROACH
The Third Circuit recently defined "program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance" as an integrated institution that benefits,
directly or indirectly, from federal aid to education.102 In Grove City
College v. Bell,103 a private college that received no direct federal
funds but had students receiving federal grants10 4 refused to file an
Assurance of Compliance with the Department. 10 The court held that
Title IX's proscription of sex discrimination reached every facet of the
college's operation. 106 Because the college in question was an "inte-
grated institution," 107 the court reasoned, federal aid to students indi-
rectly inures to the benefit of the entire college by releasing institu-
tional funds for use elsewhere. 08 For this reason, the court stated that
99. 2A Sutherland, supra note 22, § 47.27, at 137. "The dominant consideration
in deciding whether statutory language has general or special meaning, as with all
other issues in statutory construction, is to discover legislative intent or meaning to
others." Id. (footnote omitted).
100. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1976).
101. Unwarranted Compromise, supra note 74, at 1118 & n.24, 1119.
102 Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684, 698-700 (3d Cir. 1982), cert.
granted, 103 S. Ct. 1181 (1983); accord Haffer v. Temple Univ., 688 F.2d 14, 16-17
(3d Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
103. 687 F.2d 684 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1181 (1983).
104. Id. at 688-89. Grove City College's philosophical reason for refusing direct
federal financial assistance is that it believes in "institutional self sufficiency." Peti-
tion for Certiorari, supra note 41, at 2-3. The College also believes that if it had to
comply with "expensive and burdensome regulations which invariably follow gov-
ernment funding" it would have to raise its tuition. Id. at 3.
105. 687 F.2d at 689.
106. Id. at 700-01.
107. Id. at 697, 699-700. For a definition of "integrated institution," see infra text
accompanying note 122.
108. 687 F.2d at 696, 700.
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the educational program must include the institution itself. 09 In addi-
tion, the remedy available for failure to comply with Title IX, the
court stated, should be "as extensive as the program benefited by the
federal funds involved."110
A. Remedial Effects
Unlike the earmark and grant-statute definitions, the integrated
institution approach promotes the remedial purposes of Title IX. All
forms of aid to education-general, earmarked and indirect-free
institutional funds for the benefit of discriminatory areas, and there-
fore would subject the entire integrated institution to Title IX. 11' That
all federal assistance to education triggers Title IX's application is not
only consistent with the legislative intent,"l2 but more importantly,
furthers the principal purpose of the statute-preventing federal mon-
ies from ever being used, even indirectly, to support discriminatory
practices. 113 Moreover, individuals would be provided with maximum
protection against sex discrimination because every facet of the insti-
tution would be covered by Title IX's proscriptions;1 4 thus, it would
be impossible to evade the statute by simply constructing a "financial
Chinese wall" around discriminatory areas. Additionally, the federal
enforcement agency would have an effective sanction, the termination
of all federal monies, to use as leverage in enforcing the statute." 5
B. The Program-Specific Language
Despite these positive remedial effects, the integrated institution
approach has been criticized and rejected on the ground that it gives
no practical meaning to the program-specific limitation."" Had Con-
109. Id. at 700.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 698-701 (non-earmarked and indirect aid subjects integrated institu-
tion to Title IX). Because no earmarked aid was involved in Grove City, the court did
not decide whether such aid would subject the entire college to Title IX. Id. at 698.
Earmarked aid should not be treated differently from general and indirect assistance.
Like the other forms of financial assistance, earmarked aid releases institutional
funds for use elsewhere, and therefore indirectly supports discriminatory practices.
112. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
113. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
114. Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684, 697-700 (3d Cir. 1982), cert.
granted, 103 S. Ct. 1181 (1983).
115. See id. at 700-01.
116. See Hillsdale College v. HEW, 696 F.2d 418, 429-30 (6th Cir. 1982);
Dougherty County School Sys. v. Harris, 622 F.2d 735, 737 (5th Cir. 1980), vacated
on other grounds, 102 S. Ct. 2264 (1982); University of Richmond v. Bell, 543 F.
Supp. 321, 330-31 (E.D. Va. 1982); Othen v. Ann Arbor School Bd., 507 F. Supp.
1376, 1382 (E.D. Mich. 1981); Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 438 F. Supp.
1021, 1033-34 (E.D. Mich. 1977), aff'd, 600 F.2d 581 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
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gress intended Title IX to authorize HEW to regulate entire institu-
tions pervasively, so the critics reason, Congress would not have ex-
pressly restricted the proscription and enforcement provisions to
programs receiving federal aid. 1 7 A careful analysis of the purpose of
the program-specific language, however, indicates that the integrated
institution approach not only gives meaning to the language but also
adequately guards against the harm that it was intended to prevent.
Because Congress borrowed Title IX's program-specific language
from Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 without explanation,
reliance on the legislative history of Title VI to determine the purpose
of the restrictive language is proper. " 8 The legislative debates indicate
that the drafters feared that an unlimited termination sanction might
lead to grossly unfair and harsh results. In particular, legislators were
profoundly concerned that discrimination in an isolated state program
could result in wholesale cut offs of federal aid to the entire state,
thereby affecting innocent state programs wholly unrelated to the
discriminatory practices. 119 Local public school systems, for example,
are geographically and administratively separate and distinct entities.
Because discrimination in one school district would thus have no
impact on another, Congress did not wish the discriminatory system
to justify the cut off of aid to all public schools within that state. 20
Thus, to prevent such arbitrary and overbroad funding terminations,
Congress adopted the program-specific language.' 21
U.S. 972 (1979). This criticism is particularly significant because the Supreme Court
in North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982), reaffirmed that Title IX is
to be limited by its program-specific language. Id. at 535-38. The Court, however,
did not define "program" or what constitutes "program-specificity." Id. at 540.
117. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
119. 110 Cong. Rec. 14,330-31 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Williams); id. at 13,125-26
(remarks of Sens. Gore & Ribicoff); id. at 8642 (remarks of Sen. Stennis); id. at 8507-
08 (remarks of Sens. Smathers & Allott); id. at 7103 (remarks of Sen. Javits); id. at
7067-68 (remarks of Sen. Ribicoff). For example, during the legislative debates on
Title VI, Senator Javits remarked, "[p]roponents of the bill have continually made it
clear that . . . it is the intent of title VI not to require wholesale cutoffs of Federal
funds from all Federal programs in entire States." 110 Cong. Rec. 7103 (1964)
(statement of Sen. Javits); see Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684, 697 & n.21
(3d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1181 (1983); Board of Pub. Instruction v.
Finch, 414 F.2d 1068, 1075 (5th Cir. 1969). For a thorough analysis of the purpose of
the program-specific language in Title VI, see Unwarranted Compromise, supra note
74, at 1116-24.
120. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
121. Unwarranted Compromise, supra note 74, at 1120-21. As the Fifth Circuit
noted in Board of Pub. Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969), the
purpose of the language was not to protect the "political entity whose funds might be
cut off, but for the protection of the innocent beneficiaries of programs not tainted by
discriminatory practices." Id. at 1075 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
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Application of the integrated institution approach does not run
afoul of this congressional concern. For purposes of Title IX, an
educational institution is integrated when discrimination in one area
taints and infects the entire institution or when financial assistance to
any part of the institution supports and benefits the discriminatory
area.1 22 Under such circumstances it is neither arbitrary nor grossly
unfair to regulate the whole institution and to apply the termination
sanction to all of the institution's federal assistance.12 3
Limiting Title IX to integrated institutions prevents the harm that
Congress so feared-the termination of funds to innocent programs
entirely free of sex discrimination.124 For example, state-wide cut offs
of federal aid to a public school system would not be possible under
the integrated institution approach. A state-wide public school system
is a collection of separate, independent parts; it is not an integrated
institution. Due to separate locations, students and facilities, discrimi-
nation in one school district has no impact on another. Moreover,
funds given to a non-discriminatory district do not significantly aid
the discriminatory district, as each district operates on an independent
budget.125 By preventing such punitive results, the integrated institu-
tion approach gives the program-specific language its intended restric-
tive meaning.126
C. Proposed Application of the "Integrated Institution" Approach
Title IX defines educational institution as a:
public or private pre-school, elementary, or secondary school, or
any institution of vocational, professional, or higher education,
except that in the case of an educational institution composed of
more than one school, college, or department which are adminis-
tratively separate units, such term means each such school, college,
or department. 12 7
Sufficient integration should be presumed at this institutional level.
Each of these entities share common location, students, facilities and
122. See Todd, supra note 38, at 111-12.
123. Imposing a termination sanction necessarily involves some hardships to inno-
cent beneficiaries, but this was Congress' chosen remedy. North Haven Bd. of Educ.
v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 535 n.26 (1982). Moreover, Congress traditionally has had
authority to attach conditions to any monies disbursed by the federal government.
See supra note 41.
124. See supra notes 119, 121 and accompanying text.
125. Arguably, federal aid to a non-discriminatory district frees state educational
funds for use in a discriminatory district. But this benefit to the discriminatory
district, to the extent any exists, is too remote and indirect to justify application of
Title IX.
126. See supra notes 119, 121 and accompanying text.
127. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(c) (1976).
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administration. 12 As a result of this web-like structure, it is not possi-
ble to separate the institution into discriminatory and non-discrimina-
tory parts or funded and unfunded parts. The "release" and "infec-
tion" theories require treating the institution as the "program" under
Title IX. 12 Indeed, to define program as something smaller than this
basic institution frustrates the broad remedial purposes of the stat-
ute. 13
0
But "program" should not be limited to this atomized institutional
level. After all, Congress could have easily substituted this definition
of institution for program had it intended such a limitation.' 3' A
particular school district or university, comprised respectively of sev-
eral primary or secondary schools and several colleges, may be suffi-
ciently integrated to justify Title IX coverage. 132 Since integration will
not always exist at this level, a case-by-case analysis should be con-
ducted to determine the degree of integration and interdependence.
Relevant factors should include: the concentration of decision-making
power; 133 the financial structure of the entity, particularly the degree
to which budgetary interdependence exists; 134 and the extent to which
institutions share common students, facilities and administrative serv-
ices. 135
CONCLUSION
In the educational process social values are molded, roles are
learned and patterns of behavior are formed. Therefore, it is particu-
larly important that sex discrimination in education be eliminated.
Congress mandated that this formative environment be free of dis-
crimination by enacting Title IX. The effects of this statute should not
be watered down by technical exercises in statutory construction;
128. See Todd, supra note 38, at 110.
129. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 21-22, 30-35 & 82-91 and accompanying text.
131. 2A Sutherland, supra note 22, § 47.36, at 163. One court relied on the
separate definition of "institution" to conclude that a "program" could never be an
institution. Hillsdale College v. HEW, 696 F.2d 418, 424-25 (6th Cir. 1982). This
approach is unnecessarily narrow: There is no reason why "program" cannot mean
something as large as or larger than an institution as defined in Title IX. See Grove
City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684, 697 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1181
(1983).
132. See Haffer v. Temple Univ., 688 F.2d 14, 16-17 (3d Cir. 1982); cf. Wright v.
Columbia Univ., 520 F. Supp. 789, 792 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (Rehabilitation Act); Yakin
v. University of Ill., 508 F. Supp. 848, 850 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (Title VI).
133. Cf. Wright v. Columbia Univ., 520 F. Supp. 789, 792 (E.D. Pa. 1981)
(Rehabilitation Act).
134. See Todd, supra note 38, at 110-13.
135. See id.
1062 [Vol. 51
1983] TITLE IX'S PROGRAM-SPECIFIC LANGUAGE 1063
rather, Title IX's broad remedial purpose requires that the statute be
given an expansive reading. The integrated institution approach,
while giving the restrictive language a practical meaning, most fully
promotes this vital social goal.
Claudia S. Lewis
